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Abstract
Trade unions tend to reduce the dispersion of wages among their mem-
bers. Skilled workers may therefore have an incentive to separate from an
encompassing union and organize into a separate craft union. This paper ex-
amines a theoretical model to gain insight into the structure of trade unions
at a firm. We show that imperfect competition in the product market may
drive skilled and unskilled workers together, even though unskilled workers use
their political power in the trade union to extract rents from the skilled work-
ers. Additionally, we examine the influence of several features of production
technology on trade union structure.
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1 Introduction
Trade unions raise wages (see, e.g., Booth, 1995, for an overview of the empirical
literature). The magnitude of their influence varies across firms and industries.
Several empirical studies show that the characteristics of the product market that
a firm operates in are crucially important for a union’s ability to raise wages; see
in particular Mishell (1986) and Stewart (1990). The degree of product market
competition determines the firm’s ’ability to pay’. A firm operating in a perfectly
competitive product market can not afford to pay wages above the wages paid in
competing firms, as it would be priced out of the market. Hence, an imperfectly
competitive product market is a necessary condition for a union to exercise influence
over the wage level in a firm.
A union must possess some bargaining power to capture a part of the profits a
firm makes in an imperfectly competitive product market. The bargaining power
of a union depends on how effectively a union can hamper production through a
strike. A union which can paralyze production completely has a strong bargaining
power. Hence, a trade union which encompasses all firm’s workers may be more
successful in raising wages than a small union surrounded by competing unions, as
an encompassing union has a larger impact on production. In practice, however,
we observe not only encompassing unions, but also small unions organized by craft,
skill, or plant (see, e.g., Machin et al., 1993). An important reason may be that
encompassing unions tend to decrease the dispersion of wages among their members.1
Some types of workers may therefore be better off by organizing into a separate union
than by joining an encompassing union.
This paper examines a theoretical model to gain insight into the structure of
trade unions at a firm. In particular, we study how product market competition
and several features of production technology affect the union formation decision.
We develop a simple model in which the work force is divided into two groups of
workers, skilled and unskilled. Workers can organize into two separate craft unions
or they can join into one encompassing union. Workers can also decide not to
form a union and to bargain individually with the employer over the wage. In
an encompassing union, decisions are made by majority voting. Low-skilled workers
1See, e.g., Freeman (1980, 1982), Gosling and Machin (1995), and Card (1996).
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are assumed to outnumber the high-skilled workers. The unskilled use their political
power in the trade union to extract rents from the skilled workers. This provides
the skilled workers with an incentive to start their own craft union.
Our analysis builds on Horn and Wolinsky (1988). They examine under what
conditions two groups of identical workers decide to form one encompassing union
rather than two separate unions. They show that the union formation decision de-
pends on the degree of substitutability between workers. The intuition is straightfor-
ward. An encompassing union covers the whole work force and therefore bargains
with the firm over the division of the entire payoff from production. A separate
union bargains with the firm over the division of the marginal contribution of its
members. The marginal contribution of a separate union is higher, the stronger
the complementarity between the groups of workers in production. Increasing the
number of employees increases production more than proportionally if workers are
sufficiently complementary. Therefore, it may be in the interest of workers to form
two separate unions, each bargaining over its marginal contribution, rather than to
form one encompassing union. Conversely, workers join forces into an encompassing
union when they are close substitutes in production.
We examine how the conditions in the product market affect the union forma-
tion decision in a setting where workers differ in productivity. We show that the
less competitive the product market, the more likely will workers unionize. More
interestingly, we show that the conditions in the product market also affect the deci-
sion to organize into an encompassing union or into two craft unions. The reason is
that imperfections in the product market give firms room to raise the price of their
product in case of a strike by part of the work force. The price increase partially
compensates the decrease in production when the members of a craft union strike.
This does not hold for an encompassing union as a strike by all workers paraly-
ses production. Therefore, imperfect competition in the product market reduces
the attractiveness of organizing into craft unions and strengthens the incentive to
organize into an encompassing union. The productivity gap between skilled and
unskilled gives skilled workers an incentive to separate from an encompassing union.
The reason is that the unskilled workers use their political power in an encompassing
union to raise their own wage at the expense of the skilled workers. Even though
skilled workers are exploited in an encompassing union, a strongly imperfect prod-
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uct market may drive the skilled and the unskilled workers together.2 Lastly, a
technology with decreasing returns to scale also encourages an encompassing union,
as it reduces the marginal contribution of each group of workers relative to total
production.
A few other papers examine the formation of trade unions. Westermark (1999)
extends the analysis of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) by introducing an arbitrary num-
ber of employees who differ in productivity. Westermark’s analysis builds on Jun
(1989) who introduces bargaining between heterogenous workers in an encompassing
union on the division of rents. In our paper, the division of rents between skilled and
unskilled workers is determined by majority voting.3 Moreover, our paper pays ex-
plicit attention to the impact of product market competition on the union formation
decision.4
The set up of the paper is as follows. The model is described in section 2. Next,
in section 3 we derive the equilibrium wages when workers bargain individually with
the firm, when workers organize into two separate unions, and when workers organize
into an encompassing union. In section 4, we examine the union formation decision.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
A firm produces output, denoted Q, using skilled and unskilled labor, denoted Ns
and Nu, respectively. Production technology is described by a CES production
function:
Q =
£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ ,
where 0 < δ < 1 is the distribution parameter, −1 < ρ 6= 0 is the substitution
parameter, and γ > 0 accounts for returns to scale in production. We assume that
2Alternatively, Agell and Lommerud (1992) argue that insurance motives may give high-
productivity workers an incentive to stay within an encompassing union which pursues an egali-
tarian wage policy. We abstract from uncertainty about worker’s future skill.
3Trade unions can be viewed as political organizations which are democratically organized, see
Freeman and Medoff (1984) and Booth (1995).
4Another paper worth mentioning is Davidson (1988). While we examine the incentives of
heterogeneous workers of a particular firm to join in an encompassing union, he examines the
incentives of homogeneous workers of different firms to join in an industrywide union.
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δ > 1
2
, skilled workers are more productive than unskilled workers. Production
technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale if γ < 1, constant returns to scale
if γ = 1, and increasing returns to scale if γ > 1. The parameter ρ determines the
ease with which skilled labor can be substituted for unskilled labor.5 If ρ→−1, the
two inputs become perfect substitutes. If ρ→ + ∞, the production factors become
perfect complements.
The firm operates in an imperfectly competitive product market. The demand
for the firm’s product is given by Qd = P−η, where P is the price of output and
η > 1 is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand. We use the price
elasticity as a measure of product market competition. The larger is η, the more
competitive is the product market. The firm is a price taker if η → +∞. The firm’s
profit V is equal to:
V =
£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) −WsNs −WuNu,
whereWs denotes the wage for skilled workers andWu the wage for unskilled workers.
For simplicity, we abstract from fixed costs. The trade union (or trade unions) is a
monopoly supplier of labor (of a particular type). Furthermore, we assume that the
levels of employment Ns and Nu are set before the wage formation process.6
The firm’s employees are organized either into one encompassing trade union or
into two craft unions, each representing a skill type. Employees may also decide
not to organize into a union. A worker prefers to bargain individually with the
firm if the resulting wage is higher than or equal to the wage a worker could obtain
by cooperating with other workers in a union. An encompassing union bargains
with the firm over the wages of both the skilled and the unskilled workers. Craft
unions bargain independently of each other with the firm over the level of the wage
for their members. An encompassing union arises only if both the skilled and the
unskilled workers are better off in an encompassing union than in a craft union.
5The elasticitiy of substitution σ = 11+ρ .
6We have examined the case in which the firm can decide (after wages have been set) to employ
only parts of the groups of skilled and unskilled workers. Unfortunately, however, we were not
able to obtain analytical solutions without seriously compromising on the structure of the model.
In a model of union formation with three homogenous workers, Westermark (1999) studies the
consequences of endogenous employment before wages are set. Credibility of the firm’s commitment
not to hire a part of the work force after wages are set may be problematic in practice, however.
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Clearly, there is a conflict of interest among members in an encompassing union on
the wage differential. This conflict can be resolved in several ways (e.g., through
voting, bargaining). We assume that union members take decisions by majority
voting and that the unskilled workers constitute a majority (Nu > Ns).7
For convenience, worker’s utility is assumed to be linear in income.8 The worker’s
reservation utility is assumed to be zero.9
3 Wage formation
This section derives the equilibrium wages under three different bargaining struc-
tures: individual bargaining, two craft unions, and one encompassing union. Section
4 shows under what conditions a particular bargaining structure emerges.
3.1 Individual bargaining
In the absence of unions, each worker bargains individually with the firm over his
wage. We focus on an interior solution, that is, we assume that in equilibrium all
of the workers reach an agreement with the firm. At any moment in time, both
the firm and each of the workers can ask for a renegotiation. In equilibrium, wages
are such that neither the firm nor any of the workers has an incentive to ask for a
renegotiation. The firm’s fall-back position in a bargain with a worker is the profit
it would obtain if the worker quits the firm. The worker’s fall-back position (his
reservation utility) is assumed to be zero. The outcome of the bargain between the
firm and a skilled worker is given by the generalized Nash bargaining solution:
max
to Ws
φ =
n£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) − £δ(Ns − 1)−ρ + (1− δ)N−ρu ¤−γρ (1− 1η ) −WsoWs.
7Empirical studies of unions support the assumptions that unions take decisions through voting
and that the unskilled constitute a majority, see Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984).
8Concavity of the utility function reduces the share of the rents that workers obtain, but does
not afffect the workers’ incentives to form craft unions or an encompassing union.
9Non-zero reservation utility seriously complicates the analysis (cf. Horn and Wolinsky, 1988).
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The first-order condition reads after some rewriting:
Ws =
1
2
n£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) − £δ(Ns − 1)−ρ + (1− δ)N−ρu ¤−γρ (1− 1η )o .
(1)
Equation (1) shows that the wage of a skilled worker is equal to a half of his marginal
contribution to the firm’s revenues. Similarly, we can derive:
Wu =
1
2
n£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) − £δN−ρs + (1− δ)(Nu − 1)−ρ¤−γρ (1− 1η )o .
(2)
Clearly, the wage of unskilled workers is always lower than the wage of skilled work-
ers, since the skilled are more productive (δ > 1
2
) and the unskilled outnumber the
skilled (Nu > Ns).
3.2 Two craft unions
Suppose the unskilled workers are organized into union U and the skilled workers
are organized into union S. Each craft union bargains separately with the firm over
the wage of its own members. As in section 3.1, we assume that in equilibrium both
craft unions reach an agreement with the firm. The firm’s fall-back position in a
bargain with a craft union is the profit it would obtain if the members of the craft
union would be on strike. This follows the approach in Horn and Wolinsky (1988).
Consider the bargain between the firm and union S over the wage of the skilled
workers. The firm’s fall-back position is the profit it would obtain if only the un-
skilled workers are available for production. The fall-back position of the skilled
workers is zero. Maximizing the Nash bargaining function towards Ws results in:
Ws =
1
2
µ
1
Ns
¶n£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) − £(1− δ)N−ρu ¤−γρ (1− 1η )o . (3)
Union S captures half of the marginal contribution of the skilled workers and dis-
tributes the acquired rents equally over its members.
Along the same line, we obtain:
Wu =
1
2
µ
1
Nu
¶n£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) − £δN−ρs ¤−γρ (1− 1η )o . (4)
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Union U captures half of the marginal contribution of the unskilled workers and
distributes these rents over its members.
3.3 One encompassing union
Finally, suppose all employees are organized into one encompassing union. Wages
Ws and Wu are determined in a bargain between the firm and a union represen-
tative. The union representative is a worker elected by majority rule. Since we
assume that unskilled workers outnumber the skilled workers, the representative of
an encompassing union maximizes the utility of the unskilled workers. We impose
the condition that the wage of the skilled workers at least equals the wage of the
unskilled workers. If Wu > Ws, then skilled workers would claim to be unskilled so
as to earn a higher wage. As a consequence, forming an encompassing union implies
full wage equality within the firm (Ws = Wu). Both the firm’s fall-back position as
well as the fall-back position of the encompassing union equals zero. Maximizing
the Nash bargaining function results in:
Ws =Wu =
1
2
µ
1
Nu +Ns
¶£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) . (5)
The encompassing union captures half of the total amount of firm’s revenues. These
rents are equally distributed among all employees.
4 Union formation decision
This section analyzes the union formation decision using the results of section 3.
We first examine under what conditions it is profitable for employees to organize
themselves.
Lemma 1 Employees organize into a union if and only if the marginal revenue
product declines with employment.
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 1 states that employees organize into a union (encompassing or craft)
only if the revenues of the firm show decreasing returns to the level of employment.
The intuition is straightforward. Decreasing returns imply that at the margin a
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single worker adds less to a firm’s revenues than the average revenue per worker.
The firm takes advantage of the low marginal contribution of a single worker if the
firm bargains with each worker individually. Clearly, in case of decreasing returns,
there are benefits from organizing into a union for the employees. A union bargains
over the contribution to firm’s revenues of all the union members and distributes
the acquired rents equally among the members. From Lemma 1, it is clear that
less intense competition in the product market fosters unionization. The reason
is that inframarginal profits increase relative to marginal profits when the product
market becomes less competitive. Employees prefer to bargain individually with the
firm if an increase in employment leads to a more than proportional increase in the
revenues of the firm. This is because the marginal contribution of a single worker
then exceeds the average contribution of the members of a union.
Suppose the conditions in Lemma 1 are satisfied and, consequently, employees
prefer unions. This raises the question whether employees organize into two separate
craft unions or into one encompassing union. An encompassing union arises only if it
is in the interest of both the skilled and the unskilled workers. Comparing equation
(3) with equation (5), it follows that skilled workers prefer joining an encompassing
union if:
£
(1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) −µ NuNu +Ns
¶£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) > 0. (6)
Comparing (4) to (5) shows that unskilled workers prefer joining an encompassing
union if:
£
δN−ρs
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) −µ NsNu +Ns
¶£
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
¤−γρ (1− 1η ) > 0. (7)
Since δ > 1
2
andNu > Ns, condition (6) is always more restrictive than condition (7).
Hence, unskilled workers are willing to form an encompassing union for a broader
range of parameter values than skilled workers. The reason is that the unskilled
workers use their political power to extract rents from the skilled workers so that an
encompassing union reduces wage dispersion. Proposition 1 describes under what
conditions an encompassing union is more likely to arise.
Proposition 1 If the condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied, an encompassing union is
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more likely to arise if:
i) the product market is less competitive (η → 1),
ii) the workers are more easily substitutable (ρ→ −1),
iii) the technology exhibits stronger decreasing returns to scale (γ → 0), and if
iv) the productivity differences are smaller (δ → 1
2
).
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 1 describes four factors which affect union formation. We explain
the role of these factors in detail. The fall-back position of the firm when bargaining
with an encompassing union is zero. The fall-back position of the firm when bar-
gaining with a craft union is the revenues if the members of the craft union would
leave the firm. The firm then continues production at a lower level since only the
members of the other craft union work. In a perfectly competitive product market,
this decrease in production does not affect the price. In an imperfectly competitive
product market, the firm partially compensates for the loss in production by increas-
ing the price. This improves the fall-back position of the firm in the bargain with
a craft union. Craft unions therefore obtain a smaller part of the rents. Product
market competition does not affect the fall-back position of the firm when workers
are organized into an encompassing union. The reason is that an encompassing
union can stop all production. Hence, the incentive to form an encompassing union
is stronger when the competition in the product market is less intense. A strong
complementarity in production between the two groups of workers encourages the
forming of craft unions. The firm’s revenues in case only one group of workers is
available for production are low when the two groups are complementary in produc-
tion. Consequently, the fall-back position of the firm bargaining with a craft union
is weak and thus provides the workers with an incentive to form craft unions.10
Stronger decreasing returns to scale give workers an incentive to organize into an
encompassing union as it reduces the marginal contribution of each group relative
to the total value of production.
10Note that for any ρ > 0, it holds that if either Ns or Nu approaches zero, the production Q
approaches zero. Hence, the fall-back position of the firm bargaining with a craft union is zero,
as in the bargain with an encompassing union. Then, two craft unions arise which capture half of
total firm’s revenues each. For any ρ ∈ (−1, 0) either one union or two unions may arise.
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Lastly, the difference in productivity between skilled and unskilled workers affect
the decision to unite. Skilled workers have an incentive to start their own craft union
because unskilled workers reduce wage dispersion in an encompassing union. This
incentive is stronger the larger the productivity gap between skilled and unskilled
workers. Although skilled workers are exploited in an encompassing union, they
may have an incentive to cooperate with the unskilled. The decision whether to
join an encompassing union or to form two craft unions ultimately depends on the
combination of the factors mentioned in Proposition 1.
5 Concluding remarks
Trade unions compress the distribution of wages among their members. High skilled
workers may therefore have an incentive to separate from an encompassing union
and organize into a craft union. This paper has examined conditions under which
an encompassing union arises rather than two separate craft unions. We have shown
that the bargaining position of a craft union depends on the degree of competition in
the product market and on several features of the production technology. Imperfect
competition in the product market and a production technology characterized by
decreasing returns to scale give incentives to join forces, as they weaken the conse-
quences for the firm of a strike by craft union members. In contrast, a strike by a
part of the work force greatly reduces a firm’s revenues if workers are complemen-
tary in production, thereby improving the bargaining position of a craft union. The
incentive to organize into a craft union is also stronger, the larger is the productivity
differential between skilled and unskilled workers.
Our model certainly overstates the union’s ability to reduce wage dispersion
among their members. First, different ways of deciding upon the wage policy of the
union, through for example a bargain or requiring unanimity, may result in larger
wage inequality in an encompassing union than under majority voting. Second, the
incentive of an encompassing union to compress wages may be lower when the firm
can adjust employment after wages are set. The reason is that an increase in the
wage of the unskilled, at the expense of the skilled, induces the firm to employ less
unskilled workers. Including these features certainly complicates the analysis but
need not affect our main results qualitatively. We conjecture that skilled workers
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will have a stronger incentive to join in an encompassing union as unskilled workers
are less able or less willing to extract rents. The comparative static results regarding
product market competition and production technology may, nevertheless, still hold.
Our analysis has clear testable implications. It would be particularly interesting
to test whether the intensity of competition in the product market has an effect on
the number of trade unions which bargain with the firm or industry. Our theoretical
analysis suggests that imperfect competition in the product market not only affects
the decision to form a union but also affects the incentive for workers with different
skills to join forces.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Define firm’s revenues [δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu ]
−γρ (1−
1
η ) as a function of the
levels of employment f(Ns, Nu).
Consider a skilled worker. A skilled worker prefers joining a craft union to
individual bargaining if:
1
Ns
[f(Ns, Nu)− f(0, Nu)] > f(Ns, Nu)− f(Ns − 1, Nu),
which is satisfied if and only if f(·) is a concave function in the level of Ns, that is,
if the marginal revenue product declines in employment. A skilled worker prefers
joining an encompassing union to individual bargaining if:
1
Ns +Nu
f(Ns, Nu) > f(Ns, Nu)− f(Ns − 1, Nu).
This condition only holds if f(·) is a concave function in the level of Ns. Concluding,
concavity of the revenue function of the firm is a necessary and sufficient condition
for skilled workers to organize themselves. Skilled workers may organize themselves
into a craft union or they may decide to join the unskilled into an encompassing
union.
Along the same line of reasoning, we can show that unskilled workers prefer
organizing themselves if and only if f(·) is a concave function in the level of Nu.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First, note that if ρ > 0, then firm’s revenues approach zero if either Ns
or Nu approaches zero. As a consequence, both condition (6) and (7) are violated
and two craft unions arise.
Now, consider the case where −1 < ρ < 0. We can restrict attention to condition
(6) as condition (7) is always less restrictive than (6). Rewriting condition (6) gives:
µ
Nu +Ns
Nu
¶
−
·
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
(1− δ)N−ρu
¸−γρ (1− 1η )
> 0.
Let us first examine the effect of γ and η. For convenience, define α = −γρ (1−
1
η ),
where α > 0 since γ > 0, −1 < ρ < 0 and η > 1. Both γ and η affect condition (6)
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only through α. Taking the derivative with respect to α gives:
d
dα = −
·
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
(1− δ)N−ρu
¸α
ln
·
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
(1− δ)N−ρu
¸
< 0.
An increase in α makes condition (6) more restrictive. Hence, an increase in γ or
an increase in η makes condition (6) more restrictive and, consequently, an encom-
passing union less likely to arise.
Next, consider the impact of ρ. Taking the derivative with respect to ρ gives:
d
dρ =
γ
ρ
µ
1− 1η
¶
δ
1− δ
µ
Nu
Ns
¶ρ ·δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
(1− δ)N−ρu
¸−γρ (1− 1η )−1
ln
µ
Nu
Ns
¶
+
− γρ2 (1−
1
η )
·
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
(1− δ)N−ρu
¸−γρ (1− 1η )
ln
·
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
(1− δ)N−ρu
¸
< 0,
where we use Nu > Ns and hence ln
³
Nu
Ns
´
> 0. An increase in ρ makes it less likely
that workers join in an encompassing union.
Finally, consider the impact of δ on condition (6). Rewrite condition (6) gives:
µ
Nu +Ns
Nu
¶ 1
α
−
·
δN−ρs + (1− δ)N−ρu
(1− δ)N−ρu
¸
> 0.
Taking the derivative with respect to δ gives:
d
dδ = −
µ
Ns
Nu
¶−ρ
1
(δ − 1)2 < 0.
Clearly, the skilled have a stronger incentive to separate from an encompassing union
if their productivity level increases.
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